Deep neural networks, although shown to be a successful class of machine learning algorithms, are known to be extremely unstable to adversarial perturbations. Improving the robustness of neural networks against these attacks is important, especially for security-critical applications. To defend against such attacks, we propose dividing the input image into multiple patches, denoising each patch independently, and reconstructing the image, without losing significant image content. This proposed defense mechanism is nondifferentiable which makes it non-trivial for an adversary to apply gradient-based attacks. Moreover, we do not fine-tune the network with adversarial examples, making it more robust against unknown attacks. We present a thorough analysis of the tradeoff between accuracy and robustness against adversarial attacks. We evaluate our method under black-box, grey-box, and white-box settings. The proposed method outperforms the state-ofthe-art by a significant margin on the ImageNet dataset under grey-box attacks while maintaining good accuracy on clean images. We also establish a strong baseline for a novel white-box attack.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have produced valuable results on many practical applications (Lin et al., 2014; Deng et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2016; Abu-El-Haija et al., 2016; Krasin et al., 2016) , but are vulnerable to even small adversarial perturbations (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017; Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016; Brown et al., 2017) . In particular, such perturbations can change the decision of DNN-based image classifiers. The vulnerability of deep networks to adversarial manipulations of their input goes beyond classification tasks and additive perturbations Metzen et al., 2017a; Chaowei Xiao, Correspondence to: Ashish Shrivastava <ashish.s@apple.com>. This paper has been submitted for publication on February 9, 2018. 2018; Kanbak et al., 2017) . Moreover, the attacks are transferrable, meaning that an adversary can find these perturbations without having access to the network. For example, (Liu et al., 2016) successfully attacked image classifiers used in commercial applications. These observations highlight the need to improve the robustness of deep networks, especially, if they are deployed in a hostile or security-critical environment.
Many existing defense methods either show results on smaller datasets, such as MNIST or CIFAR-10 (Bhagoji et al., 2017) , or they add adversarial examples to the training data (Tramèr et al., 2017) . Since new attacks are constantly being proposed, an ideal defense should be attack-agnostic to make it robust against an unknown attack. The defense should Zbe non-differentiable so it does not allow the adversary to back-propagate through the defense mechanism.
Our defense mechanism ( Figure 1 ) maps an input image to a new space and is based on the following observations:
(1) increased dimensionality has an adverse effect on the robustness of deep networks , (2) the mapping should not reduce the accuracy of clean data, and (3) the mapping should be stable such that the output is minimally sensitive to input perturbations.
Our method divides the input image into multiple overlap-
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ping patches that are projected to a lower dimensional space using a dictionary. The dictionary consists of clean image patches to reconstruct the input image patches with a variant of the matching pursuit (MP) algorithm (Mallat & Zhang, 1993) . We use this algorithm for denoising because it is fast and non-differentiable. We propose a novel patch-selection algorithm to construct the dictionary such that the selected patches are not too similar and they represent the salient parts of the image. This selection process mitigates the effect of adversarial perturbations while maintaining good accuracy on clean images.
We evaluate our algorithm using the ImageNet dataset under three settings -(1) black-box attacks where the adversary does not know about the network or the defense method, (2) grey-box attacks where the adversary knows the network parameters but not about the defense mechanism, and (3) white-box attacks where the adversary knows both the network parameters and the defense algorithm. Our algorithm performs comparably to other state-of-the-art methods on the black-box setting and performs significantly better on grey-box attacks. We also propose a simple yet effective attack in the white-box setting and establish a strong baseline performance. In addition, we show that as task complexity decreases (e.g. with a subset of the ImageNet classes), we can remove more information content from image by denoising without losing much accuracy or robustness.
Our contributions are:
• We propose a novel framework for defending against adversarial attacks by dividing images into overlapping patches and denoising them independently using a nondifferentiable, attack-agnostic algorithm.
• We provide a thorough analysis of the tradeoff between clean image accuracy and robustness against adversarial attacks.
• We provide a novel white-box attack, and show how randomization can help improve the defense in such cases.
Related Work
The seminal work by (Szegedy et al., 2014) highlights the vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples. Since then, many methods have been proposed to assess such vulnerability by developing various adversarial attacks. In (Goodfellow et al., 2015) , the authors proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which attacks a classifier by computing the sign of the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the input images. To assess the robustness of deep networks more accurately, iterative algorithms such as DeepFool and C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) have later been introduced. It is also possible to use generative models like Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to generate adversarial perturbations (Baluja & Fischer, 2017; Hayes & Danezis, 2017) .
In (Szegedy et al., 2014) , it has also been shown that adversarial attacks are transferrable and can be used in black-box attacks. In these attacks, the adversary has access neither to the weights of the network nor to the architecture. More recently, it has been shown that there exists image-agnostic attacks, universal adversarial perturbation , which can be added to any image to fool a given network. Even worse, these perturbations can be computed without the dataset used for training the network (Mopuri et al., 2017) .
The first defense against adversarial perturbations was proposed by (Gu & Rigazio, 2014) where they used stacked denoising auto-encoders to mitigate perturbations. In (Papernot et al., 2016) , distillation was suggested as a defense; however, it only masks the gradient and is still vulnerable in black-box settings as demonstrated in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . Recently, adversarial training has been applied on large-scale datasets, e.g. ImageNet, using an ensemble of networks (Tramèr et al., 2017) . The main drawback of adversarial training is that it usually overfits the perturbation generated by a specific attack and does not generalize against an unknown attack. Very recently, several strategies to defend against attacks have been explored using various image transformations (Guo et al., 2017) . As a different approach, detecting malicious samples, instead of improving the robustness, is sought in (Metzen et al., 2017b; Feinman et al., 2017) . They demonstrated that deep networks can be augmented with a network to detect adversarial examples. This approach also suffers from overfitting to specific types of perturbations. Recent work, (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) , has successfully attacked ten different defense strategies emphasizing the difficulty of this problem.
There have been few theoretical works studying the robustness of deep networks. Fawzi et al. (2015) showed that there is a tradeoff between accuracy and robustness of kernel classifiers. In , the authors established a bound on the robustness of a certain type of classifiers when the adversary is restricted to a low dimensional space. In (Sinha et al., 2017; Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) , a lower bounds have been derived on the robustness of simple neural networks.
Problem Formulation
Let f θ (x) : R d → N be a classifier parameterized by θ that computes the class of an input image x, where N is the set of natural numbers denoting class labels. An adversary can perturb the image with noise v such that f θ (x) = f θ (x+v). The norm of the noise is kept small so that the corrupted Figure 2 . Reducing dimensionality improves the robustness of the classifier. P is a union of subspaces illustrated by the blue hyperplanes. Here,x = T (x) is the image projected to the nearest subspace in P. To avoid clutter, we are not showing the original image x. The adversarial noise v * is the smallest distance from x to the classifier's decision surface B. When the adversary is restricted to a smaller dimensional subspace (the projected hyperplane), the norm of the noise vP is much bigger than the norm of v * to cross the decision boundary.
image appears the same as the original image to a human. The robustness of the classifier at x 0 , denoted by ρ(x 0 ), can be defined as the minimum perturbation needed to change the predicted label :
The noise can be scaled to make the attack stronger. We improve the robustnesss by learning a stable transformation T (.) such that the label of the transformed image does not change when corrupted with the noise, i.e. f θ (T (x)) = f θ (T (x + v)). Moreover, we want to maintain the accuracy when the clean images are transformed by T (.) ensuring that the f θ (T (x)) is equal to the ground truth label of x. Most attacks rely on computing gradients of the classification function w.r.t. the input. Hence, it is desirable to make the transformation T (.) non-differentiable so that the gradients cannot pass through the defense block. To create a defense mechanism that is robust against an unknown future attack, we want to keep the defense algorithm to be attack-agnostic and do not want to fine-tune the network with simulated adversarial images.
Under some regularity conditions, restricting the adversary to a low dimensional subspace can improve the robustness . Simple dimensionality reduction methods, such as PCA, have been studied in (Bhagoji et al., 2017; Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) to improve defense against adversarial perturbations. However, such solutions only work on simpler tasks (such as classification on MNIST digits) as they significantly decrease the discriminative per- formance of the network. Such transformations usually remove the high frequency information required for complex tasks such as 1000-class classification on ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009 ). Therefore, a better information preserving dimensionality reduction method is required to limit the space of adversarial noise, while keeping important details.
The D3 Algorithm
Assume that an operator T (x) projects the input image x ∈ R d to the closest subspace in a union of m dimensional subspaces. This operation is a linear projection operator onto an m dimensional subspace in a local neighborhood of x. For additive perturbations, the adversary is limited to locally seeking noise in an m dimensional subspace and the robustness ρ can ideally be improved by a factor of d/m . This intuition is illustrated in Figure 2 . Motivated by this result, we look for a transformation T (.) satisfying the following conditions:
is the Jacobian matrix in a small neighborhood of x,
The first condition ensures that the local dimensionality is low, and the second condition means that the image and its transformed version are close enough to each other so the visual information is preserved.
We propose a patch-based denoising method for defense. We divide the input image into multiple patches, and denoise them independently with sparse reconstruction using a dictionary of patches. Assume that κ is the sparsity (number of components used to reconstruct a patch) and each patch is P × P pixels. Then, for non-overlapping patches, the local dimensionality of our projection operator T (.) would be κ d P 2 . According to , this dimensionality reduction would ideally improve robustness by a factor of
Sparse reconstruction and dictionary-based methods have been widely used to enhance the quality of images (Aharon et al., 2006; Mairal et al., 2008; Elad, 2010; Wright et al., 2010; Shrivastava et al., 2015; Pati et al., 1993) . For computational efficiency, we use sampled image patches as our dictionary. We use a novel patch selection algorithm that is optimized to improve robustness of the classifier. For sparse reconstruction, we use an efficient greedy algorithm which is a variant of matching pursuit (Mallat & Zhang, 1993) . Our method is summarized in Figure 3 .
Computing the performance of the D3 algorithm for different hyper-parameters requires both training the D3 algorithm and the classification network, which are computationally expensive. Therefore, to efficiently study the effect of hyper-parameters of our algorithm, we compute the following proxy metrics:
(1) "Matching-rate" (MR) is the fraction of patches that are identical in the denoised image T (x + v) and the clean image T (x). Let {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } and {p 1 ,p 2 , . . . ,p n } be patches extracted from x and x + v, respectively. The matching-rate is defined as, MR = E x∈D (γ(x)), where
and 1 [.] is an indicator function. Here, with slight abuse of notation, we assume that T (.) is applied to patches. Higher MR corresponds to being more robust to the attacks.
(2)"Reconstruction-error" (RE) is the average 2 distance between the clean image x and the transformed image T (x):
A higher reconstruction-quality (1 − RE) results in higher classification accuracy for the clean images as more information is retained.
Our experiments show that these proxy metrics are highly correlated with accuracy and robustness of the classifier. We use a small set of randomly chosen images (500) from the dataset to quickly compute these values. Next, we describe the patch denoising algorithm (D3-MP), and the patch-selection algorithm to construct the dictionaries (D3-DL).
Patch-based Denoising (D3-MP)
be a set of dictionaries computed using our patch-selection algorithm. Each dictionary S i ∈ R
is a matrix containing η columns of dimension P 2 . Here, κ is the sparsity. The first dictionary S 1 is used to select the first atom, while reconstructing a given patch p. Then, the residual is computed between the image patch p and the selected atom s l . As in the standard matching pursuit (MP), the residual is used to select the next atom. But unlike standard MP, we use a different dictionary S i to select at the i th sparsity level. We summarize this approach in Algorithm 1.
Patch Selection Algorithm to Learn Dictionaries (D3-DL)
To scale up the dictionary learning task for a large dataset such as ImageNet, we propose an efficient greedy patchselection algorithm. As mentioned earlier, we compute multiple dictionaries for different sparsity levels in our D3-MP algorithm.
We build the set of dictionaries in a greedy manner by selecting the "important" and "diverse" patches. The algorithm takes into account the saliency information of images. The norm of the gradient of the classification function w.r.t. to the input image is used as the saliency map. We do importance sampling among all the patches w.r.t. the saliency map. We add this patch to the dictionary if the reconstruction of this patch using the existing dictionary has greater than a threshold, , angular distance from the patch. The saliency map helps preserving the details that are important for the classification task, whereas the cutoff on the angular distance ensures that the dictionary is diverse.
In our experiments, using a pre-tained network on the ImageNet dataset, we find 4% improvement in classification accuracy with the saliency map compared to randomly selecting a patch from the whole image. The diversity among dictionary atoms encourages mapping a clean and corresponding noisy image patch to the same dictionary atom. Ensuring that any two patches from the dictionary are a certain threshold apart also improves the MR and the robustness of the classifier.
Algorithm 2 D3-DL
Input: saliency algorithm H, training images D, size of dictionary η, sparsity κ, . Output: set of dictionaries
Compute saliency map H(x). Randomly select patch s from x according to H(x).
Concatenate r/ r 2 to columns of S i n ← n + 1
After the first dictionary is constructed, we reconstruct the image patches using this dictionary and compute the residuals. The next dictionary is constructed on the residual images instead of the original images. This process is repeated for all the remaining dictionaries, as described in Algorithm 2. We found that the MR and 1 -RE were higher when we used a different dictionary for different sparsity using residual images compared to using one common dictionary for all sparsity levels constructed from original images. For example, with κ = 2, we found the MR = 0.88, 1 -RE=0.83 when using two separate dictionaries where the second dictionary contained residuals instead of image patches. Comparing those to MR = 0.80, 1 -RE=0.81 when using one dictionary, constructed using original image patches, shows that using multiple dictionaries gives better matching-rate and reconstruction quality.
Denoising Algorithm
The proposed defense algorithm (D3): (1) divides the input image into overlapping patches, (2) denoises each patch (with D3-MP) using the constructed dictionaries (with D3-DL), and (3) reconstructs the denoised image by averaging the pixels in overlapping patches. In our experiments, we set the amount of overlap to 75% of the patch size.
Randomization:
In our experiments, we observe that without giving access to the patch dictionaries (i.e. the grey-box setting), the D3 algorithm is successful in defending against the adversarial attack. However, the defense is weaker when the adversary has access to the dictionary. This observation motivates us to add randomization to our transformation function T (.) when the adversary has full access to the D3 algorithm (white-box setting). By adding randomization, even though the adversary can access the dictionary, exact atoms used for reconstruction will not be available. We add following efficient randomization schemes to our defense:
• We randomize over the columns of the dictionaries by randomly selecting one fifth of the atoms in the patch dictionaries while denoising a patch.
• We further randomize by first selecting top-2 most correlated atoms from the patch dictionary and randomly picking one out of those two.
We use these randomization schemes on both training and test images.
Experiments
We conduct experiments on the 1000-class ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009 ) with a ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) . We evaluate defense against the following diverse set of attack algorithms -FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) which is a one-step attack where gradient direction is multiplied by the norm of the noise, DeepFool (MoosaviDezfooli et al., 2016) that is an iterative attack ensuring that the network output is changed, and UAP (MoosaviDezfooli et al., 2017) as a transferable attack that computes a universal noise for all the images. We compute the adversarial perturbation in floating point and scale it to have a fixed 2 norm, i.e.
v 2 x 2 = 0.06. This noise is added to the image after it has been converted to floating point and normalized. This experimental setup is described in (Guo et al., 2017) . We compare the D3 algorithm with several image transformation based defenses proposed in (Guo et al., 2017) and show significant improvement in classification accuracy in grey-box settin. Furthermore, we analyze the tradeoff between the clean image accuracy and the robustness against the attacks. We study the effect of the hyper-parameter values and show how they can be tuned to improve the accuracy or the robustness. We use a pretrained network on the original image space x and fine-tune it on the transformed images T (x). We set = 0.85 for dictionary reconstruction.
Tradeoff between Accuracy and Robustness
Hyper-parameters of the D3 algorithm can be used to control the quality of image reconstruction. For example, as we increase the sparsity κ, more details are preserved and the accuracy on the reconstructed clean images, T (x), is From these two figures, we can see that clean image accuracy and the reconstruction quality increase with sparsity. The MR decreases with sparsity, causing the classifier to be less robust. The classifier performance on adversarially perturbed images is low with small sparsity due to low reconstruction quality, and is also low with large sparsity because of low matching-rate. The optimal performance is achieved at an intermediate value (e.g. κ = 4 for DeepFool attack). Due to computational constraints, we reduce the patch overlap to 8 pixels for this analysis which improves the reconstruction speed by 4x. improved. However, if the image has been corrupted with adversarial noise, increasing κ reconstructs more noise, and the accuracy on the reconstructed noisy images, T (x + v), eventually decreases.
We plot the accuracy on clean and noisy images with a greybox attack in Figure 4 (a). As we can see from the plots, the classification accuracy on the clean images consistently improves with sparsity. The accuracy on the noisy images is low with small sparsity and increases in the beginning as the reconstruction quality improves. After increasing the sparsity to a large value, the noise also starts getting reconstructed, and the classification accuracy drops. Hence, there is a "sweet spot" (for example, κ = 4 for DeepFool) for optimal defense against the attack, and sparsity can be used as a tradeoff parameter.
Figure 4(b) shows the matching-rate (MR) and the reconstruction-quality (1 -RE) for the same sparsity values. We see that the reconstruction quality improves with sparsity, and is correlated with the classification accuracy on the clean images. However, the matching-rate decreases as sparsity is increased, causing the network to be less robust to adversarial noise. Figure 5 shows example images with different sparsity values. In our experiments, we find that dictionary size also plays a role in the accuracy and robustness tradeoff. A larger dictionary improves the accuracy on the clean images because the images are better reconstructed. A smaller dictionary generally improves the robustness because the dictionary atoms are, on average, farther apart. This correlation between the (MR, 1-RE) and the classifier's performance enables us to efficiently study the effects of hyper-parameters.
Based on this analysis, we pick three settings to evaluate our algorithm. In the first setting, we set high sparsity and choose a large dictionary (κ = 5, dictionary size η = 40K). This setting encourages high accuracy on the clean images, but is less robust against adversarial attacks. In the second setting, we reduce the dictionary size while keeping the sparsity the same (κ = 5, dictionary size η = 10K). In the third setting, we set the dictionary size η = 10K, and reduce the sparsity to 4, further improving the robustness. Next, we describe three types of attacks (black-box, grey-box, and white-box) and compare our results with the state-of-the-art.
Black-box Attack
In this attack, the adversary does not have access to the network parameters, or the defense mechanism. We use a separate ResNet-50 network and compute the adversarial perturbations using original images, x. As mentioned earlier, the norm of the noise is set to 0.06 and it is added to the floating point image. Without our defense, the classification accuracies reduce to: 25.6% for DeepFool, 34.5% for FGSM, and 43.3% for universal perturbations. As shown in Table 1 , all the methods are robust to these attacks as this attack is the easiest to defend. Note that here we assume that the adversary knows about the network architecture but not the exact parameters.
Grey-box Attack
In this setting, the adversary does not have access to the defense mechanism but knows about the network weights. We compute all the noise patterns using gradients of the fine-tuned network evaluated at the original images x. This setting is the same as the "white-box" setting in (Guo et al., 2017) , so we compare our results in grey-box setting to their white-box setting. Without any defense mechanism, the attacks are very successful in this setting: FGSM reduces the classification accuracy to 6.2%, DeepFool reduces it to 9.2%, and UAP reduces it to 20.8%. Our results in Table 2 show that we perform significantly better than the state-ofthe-art. We also note that as we decease the dictionary size η or the sparsity κ, the robustness of the classifier improves. For example, with η = 40K, κ = 5, the DeepFool accuracy is 57.8% which improves to 64.4% by reducing η to 10K and sparsity to 4. As before, we do not use any adversarial examples while fine-tuning the network. Ensemble training (Tramèr et al., 2017) can do better on FGSM attack (69.2% accuracy) by fine-tuning the network with FGSM adversarial examples. But the trained model performs poorly with DeepFool attack, resulting only in 1.8% accuracy.
White-box Attack
We propose a novel attack when an adversary knows the weights of our fined-tuned network as well as our defense (the denoising algorithm and the used dictionary). Since the transformation function is not differentiable, we can not fool the network using gradient-based attacks (FGSM, DeepFool, or UAP). We compute the adversarial noise v using the fine-tuned network weights but the gradients are computed at the transformed image, T (x). This noise, v, is added to the image x. To the best of our knowledge, there is no defense algorithm that has been evaluated under this kind of white-box attack. Under this challenging setting, the DeepFool attack reduces the classification accuracy to 13.0%, and the FGSM attack reduces it to 34.4%. We can make the D3 more robust by adding randomization, which will prevent the attacker to access the exact atoms used for reconstruction, as described in Section 4.3. Classification accuracies using D3 with randomization are shown in Table 3 which shows significant improvement over the deterministic version. As with the other attack types, the algorithm is more robust with a smaller dictionary and smaller sparsity.
Effect of Task Complexity
For simpler tasks, the D3 algorithm can denoise the images more without losing the classification accuracy while at the same time providing the same robustness. To evaluate our defense mechanism on a lower complexity task, we randomly select 50 classes from ImageNet dataset and learn a 50-class classifier. The proposed defense is very successful on this lower complexity task.
As shown in Tables 4 and 5 , black and grey-box attacks can only lower top-1 classification accuracy of the classifier by less than 4%. In the most challenging white-box setting with DeepFool attack, top-1 classification accuracy on noisy images drops to 70.9% from 91.7% on clean images. This drop is smaller than the 35.3% loss in accuracy for the 1000-class classifier under the same setting in Table 3 .
Hyper-parameters
The proposed D3 defense has the following hyperparameters: patch-size P , sparsity κ, dictionary size η, and minimum distance between two dictionary atoms . We analyze the effect of κ on accuracy in Figure 4 , and show how the accuracy and the robustness are correlated with the matching-rate (MR) and the reconstruction-quality (1 -RE). We show the effect of different patch sizes (P = 8, 16, 24, 32) in Figure 6 on matching-rate and reconstruction-error. As we increase the patch size, the matching-rate increases improving the robustness of the algorithm. However, the reconstruction-quality (1 − RE) decreases making the classifier less accurate. Next, we 1 -RE Figure 6 . Effect of patch size (P ) on matching-rate and reconstruction-quality (1 -RE). Increasing P improves the matching-rate (robustness) but reduces the reconstruction-quality decreasing the classifier performance on the clean image. study the effect of in Figure 7 . As expected, increasing the minimum angle between two atoms, increases the matchingrate and will improve the robustness. We also find that the reconstruction-quality (1 − RE) decreases, thus decreasing the classifier accuracy. We recommend keeping high because it improves the robustness more than it hurts accuracy on the clean images.
